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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent changes in Cuba have focused largely on limited liberali-
zation of economic policies in response to the effects of the recent
world economic crisis. Cuba's experience in the last two decades,
however, suggests that when circumstances force changes in eco-
nomic policies such as those following the fall of the former Soviet
Union, the Cuban government may also make changes in the con-
stitution. This article assesses the climate for constitutional
change in Cuba in light of both the recent economic policy changes
and recent Cuban constitutional history. Section II discusses the
recent economic policy changes. Section III discusses an im-
portant feature of Cuba's diverse constitutional history, the Con-
stitution of 1940. Section IV discusses the constitutional devel-
opments of the Revolution of 1959. Section V considers the devel-
opment and nature of the post-revolution Marxist-Leninist Consti-
tution of 1976. Section VI analyzes the limited, but significant,
changes that Cuba made with its 1992 Constitutional Amend-
ments. Section VII briefly discusses the retrogressive Law of Con-
stitutional Reform of 2002.
* Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law. This article is based on a
presentation given at the seminar "Current Constitutional Issues in the Americas" held at
Duquesne University Law School, November 9-10, 2012.
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II. CUBA AND CHANGES IN ECONOMIC POLICY
The Cuban Government has undertaken significant changes
since the Soviet Union's collapse. These changes have largely
been to economic policies and not to the basic political system or
constitutional structure. Unlike the socialist governments of
Eastern Europe, the Cuban Government has endured, albeit with
economic hardship, the demise of the Soviet Union and the elimi-
nation of its substantial economic support. To survive, Cuba has
made changes to its economic system, particularly by allowing for-
eign tourism and remittances from Cubans abroad to family mem-
bers still in Cuba.' The fall of the Soviet Union also had a great
effect on agricultural policy: "In response to the crisis, the Cuban
government introduced significant changes in the organization of
agricultural production, authorized the creation of agricultural
markets, and launched an ambitious program to promote organic
and semi-organic farming techniques."'
More recently, the Cuban Government has also weathered the
change in leadership from Fidel Castro to his brother Raul Castro,
which has proceeded rather smoothly despite the expectation held
by some North Americans that it would cause disturbances or
even the fall of the Cuban Government.' When Fidel Castro be-
came ill in 2006, Rail Castro took over as acting president after
serving as the long-time head of the military. Radl Castro was
elected President by the National Assembly a few days after Fidel
Castro's official resignation in 2008.' Rail Castro has demon-
strated some flexibility in both economic and ideological matters
that may give some hope of at least limited additional constitu-
tional changes. On the economic front, Rail Castro called for de-
bate on "structural and conceptual changes" in the economy.' Alt-
hough some of these changes were small, they nevertheless repre-
1. Crystal Jamison, Family Tradition: Cuban Policy Reform as Raidl Castro Takes the
Reigns, 15 LAW & Bus. REV. AM. 891, 893-94 (2009).
2. Carmen G. Gonzalez, Seasons of Resistance: Sustainable Agriculture and Food
Security in Cuba, 16 TULANE ENVTL. L. J. 685, 712 (2003). These reforms converted state
operated farms to cooperatives, distributed some land to small producers, opened agricul-
tural markets for farmers to sell produce that they produced in excess of quotas at market
determined prices. Id. at 713-29.
3. Jamison, supra note 1, at 907-08.
4. Cuba Profile,- BBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2012, 6:48 AM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-19583445.
5. Heather E. Shreve, Harmonization, But Not Homogenization: The Case for Cuban




sent a move away from the ideological rigidity of the past. For
example, Cuban citizens were permitted to stay in tourist hotels
and to buy cellular telephones.6 Ratil Castro has also been willing
to permit more small private businesses to operate. Most signifi-
cantly, he has also sought to involve broad input from a range of
entities within the state and political party on how to increase
economic activity and the standard of living.' Throughout this
process, the government has held thousands of meetings and re-
ceived thousands of proposals.'
Since 2004, however, the Cuban Government has also avoided
making many difficult economic decisions because of the
willingness of Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez to supply
petroleum to Cuba under a barter agreement whereby Cuba
received oil products well below prevailing world market pric-
es in exchange for Cuban health care and other services....
Venezuela's money freed Cuban leaders from having to think
about changes that should have been adopted long ago.?
The global economic crisis that began in 2009 and the reduction in
Venezuela's support ensured that President Ra61 Castro's efforts
had to focus even more urgently on economic reform. In the fall of
2010, Rail Castro announced that the Cuban Communist Party
(PCC) would hold its Sixth National Congress, the first such con-
gress in fourteen years.o In September of 2010, the PCC released
its Economic and Social Policy Development Project, an outline of
economic policies to be considered at the Party Congress in April,
2011.11 After discussion and amendment, the economic proposals
were adopted by the Party Congress. 12 Professor Jorge Dominguez
has commented on the policies as follows:
The new economic program embraces many market princi-
ples, yet it also affirms the principled value of centrally set
prices for many products and services. It does not fly the flag
6. Id.
7. Jamison, supra note 1, at 896-97.
8. Id.
9. Jorge I. Domfnguez, On the Brink of Change: Cuba's Economy and Society at the
Start of the 2010's, in CUBAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: POLICY REFORMS AND
CHALLENGES IN THE 2 1sT CENTURY 1, 2-3 (Jorge I. Domfnguez, Omar Eveleny P6rez Vil-
lanueva, Mayra Espina Prieto & Lorena Barberfa eds., 2012).
10. Shreve, supra note 5, at 378.
11. Dominguez, supra note 9, at 10.
12. Id. at 12.
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of equality; instead, it challenges citizens to recognize that
"egalitarianism" is unsocialist and an impediment to better
economic performance. It vows to eliminate the rationing
card, dismiss government employees whose jobs are examples
of featherbedding, and even suspend subsidies to worker's
cafeterias. Economic rewards should go to each person ac-
cording to the quality and quantity of the individual work ef-
fort.13
While the policies propose encouraging changes and show some
ideological reordering, there remain many continuing policies that
will still inhibit economic growth.
The Cuban Government has made other changes that, while
economically motivated, also incrementally increased a few politi-
cal freedoms. Most recently, on October 16, 2012, the government
announced that it would loosen the hated restrictions it had long
imposed on foreign travel for Cuban citizens.14 To depart the
country lawfully in the past, Cubans had to obtain an expensive
exit visa and show a letter of invitation from the destination coun-
try. Beginning in mid-January 2013, Cubans, in most instances,
will only need a passport and a visa to travel outside of the coun-
try." Additionally, those who depart will be allowed to remain
outside of Cuba for two years without the need of further authori-
zation. The announcement made clear, however, that restrictions
on highly skilled professionals would remain to prevent the "brain
drain" that Cuba accuses the United States of encouraging. The
official newspaper Grandma announced:
The updating of the migration policy takes into account the
right of the revolutionary state to defend itself from the ag-
gressive and subversive plans of the US government and its
allies. For this reason, those measures aimed at preserving
the human capital created by the Revolution from theft of tal-
ents practiced by the powerful nations shall remain in force."
13. Id. at 10.









Our consideration, however, is not about the need for further
economic change in Cuba. Rather, recent developments in eco-
nomic policy are presented because they show some willingness of
the Cuban Government to move beyond ideological constraints
and demonstrate some ability of that Government to see the bene-
fits of greater openness of debate. As Professor Dominguez ob-
serves:
Ratil Castro's most salient non-economic political comment at
the party Congress came early in his main report. He de-
scribed in some detail how many meetings there had been in
advance of the Party Congress to discuss the new economic
program, how many people had participated in them, how
many suggestions had been made, which topics received the
greatest attention, and how many specific items had been
changed. In the midst of this recitation, he said, "there was
no unanimity ... and that was exactly what we needed, if we
really wanted a serious and democratic consultation with the
people." It may have been the first official praise of the ab-
sence of unanimity in a half-century of Cuban politics."7
Perhaps this limited tolerance of differences of opinion suggests
the possibility of change in other areas, such as change toward
constitutional reform and a more democratic political culture.
III. THE CUBAN CONSTITUTION OF 1940
The Constitution of the Republic of Cuba of 1940 is a document
of particular historical importance.'" It has the unique status of
being the only Cuban Constitution created by a constituent as-
sembly that was broadly representative of the full range of Cuban
political parties and social interests, including the PCC.19 The
Constitution grew out of the global economic and political turmoil
of the 1930s and, in particular, with the frustration of many Cu-
bans with the "omnipotent, irresponsible executive and a fum-
bling, rubber-stamp legislature" that led to violence in the expres-
17. Dominguez, supra note 11, at 14.
18. CONST. (1940) (Cuba). English translations of the 1940 Constitution are available
in Cuban Democratic Judiciary, CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA (1965); 1 AMos
JENKINS PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 610-82 (2d ed. 1956).
19. L. B. Klein, The Socialist Constitution of Cuba (1976), 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.




sion of political opposition.2 0 Structurally, the Constitution of
1940 introduced some elements of a semi-parliamentary system as
an intended, but ultimately unsuccessful, counterbalance to the
executive. 2 1 The 1940 Constitution's features included a bicameral
legislature,2 2 executive power exercised by the President of the
Republic, 23 and a judiciary headed by a Supreme Court, a superior
electoral court, and other tribunals as established by law.2 4 The
major change from the model of the 1901 Constitution was the
addition of a prime minister and a cabinet subject to the confi-
dence of the Congress.25
The Constitution of 1940 elaborated extensive provisions in-
tended to protect political and civil rights as well as provide exten-
sive social and economic guarantees. 26 These included many pro-
gressive provisions such as a prohibition of the death penalty ex-
cept for military crimes, treason, or espionage in time of war, 27 a
guarantee of equality making unlawful "all discrimination by rea-
son of sex, race, color, class, or any other that detracts from hu-
man dignity"28 and specific labor protections for pregnant, postpar-
tum, and nursing mothers.29
Four aspects of the Constitution of 1940 are of special relevance
when considering potential changes in Cuba's present charter.
One was a broad protection of expression stating, in part, that
"Every person can, without subjection to prior censorship, freely
express his thoughts orally, in writing, or by any other graphic or
oral means of expression, utilizing for the purpose any or all of the
20. William S. Stokes, The Cuban Parliamentary System in Action, 1940-1947, 11 J.
POL. 335, 335-36 (1949).
21. Id. at 335-39; William T. D'Zurilla, Cuba's 1976 Socialist Constitution and the
Fidelista Interpretation of Cuban Constitutional History, 55 TUL. L. REV. 1223, 1236-39
(1981).
22. CONST. (1940), arts. 119-137, (Cuba).
23. Id. arts. 138-163.
24. Id. arts. 170-208.
25. JAMES D. RUDOLPH, CUBA, A COUNTRY STUDY 160 (James D. Rudolph ed., 1985)
("The 1940 Constitution retained most of the provisions of the bill of rights from the 1901
Constitution but completely changed the structure of the government into a semi-
parliamentary system with a president, elected by universal suffrage, who was assisted by
a cabinet that was led by a prime minister. The Cabinet was directly responsible to the
Congress, which could remove any minister or the entire cabinet by a vote of no confi-
dence."); D'Zurilla, supra note 21, at 1237.
26. Jonathan Wachs, Reviving the 1940 Cuban Constitution: Arguments for Social and
Economic Rights in a Post-Castro Government, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 525, 543-44
(1994).
27. CONST. (1940), art. 25, (Cuba).
28. Id. art. 20.
29. Id. art. 68.
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available means of diffusion.""o A second provision was its protec-
tion of religious freedom stating: "The profession of all religions,
as well as the practice of all cults, is unrestricted, without other
limitation than respect for Christian morality and public order.
The church shall be separate from the State, which cannot subsi-
dize any cult."31
A third important aspect of the Constitution of 1940 was the ef-
fort it made to protect political contestation. In addition to the
protection of speech, Articles 36 and 37 expressly protected the
right to petition and to peaceful assembly.32 Additionally, Article
38 stated that "Every act which prohibits or limits the participa-
tion of citizens in the political life of the Nation is declared pun-
ishable."33
A fourth factor is particularly important. The 1940 Constitution
not only stated rights that would allow for a contested democratic
process, it also sought to establish a constitutional court able to
enforce those rights.34 The Constitution of 1940 expressly created
a system of judicial review of constitutionality. The Supreme
Court was divided into separate chambers, one of which being a
Court of Constitutional and Social Guarantees. This constitution-
al chamber was to be presided over by the Chief Justice and, when
considering constitutional matters, it would consist of at least fif-
teen members.3 ' The Court had the power " [t]o decide on the con-
stitutionality of laws, decree-laws, decrees, regulations, resolu-
tions, orders, provisions, and other acts of any body, authority or
officer. . ."3 The 1940 Constitution gave the Court of Constitu-
tional and Social Guarantees broad jurisdiction3 ' and afforded
broad standing to individuals and groups to seek relief.38
30. Id. art. 33.
31. Id. art. 35.
32. Id. arts. 36, 37.
33. Id. art. 38.
34. The author has previously discussed the history ofjudicial review in Cuba. Michael
B. Wise, Cuba and Judicial Review, 7 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 247 (2000).
35. CONST. (1940), art. 172, (Cuba).
36. Id. art. 174.
37. Art. 182. The court of constitutional and social guarantees is competent to take
cognizance of the following matters:
(a) Unconstitutionality appeals against laws, decree-laws, decrees, resolutions, or
acts that deny, diminish, restrict or impair the rights and guarantees specified in this
Constitution or that impede the unrestricted functioning of government bodies;
(b) Opinions of judges and courts as to the constitutionality of laws, decree laws, and
other provisions that they have to apply in lawsuits;
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The 1940 Constitution directly stated that the decisions of the
Court of Constitutional and Social Guarantees were binding on
all:
No law, decree-law, decree, regulation, order, provision, or
measure that has been declared unconstitutional can be ap-
plied in any case or manner, under penalty of disqualification
to hold public office.
A decision declaring unconstitutional a legal precept or an
administrative measure or resolution shall obligate the body,
authority, or officer who issued the annulled provision to re-
peal it immediately.
In every case the legislative or regulatory provision or admin-
istrative measure declared unconstitutional shall be consid-
ered null and without any value or effect from the date that
the decision is made public in court."
(c) Habeas corpus proceedings, on appeal, or when a claim made against other au-
thorities or tribunals is inefficacious;
(d) The validity of constitutional modification and procedure;
(e) Juridico-political questions and those of social legislation which the Constitution
and the law submit to its consideration;
(f) Appeals against abuse of power.
Id.
38. Art. 183. The following can apply to the court of constitutional and social guaran-
tees, without the necessity for furnishing surety:
(a) The President of the Republic, The Prime Minister and each one of the members
of the cabinet, the presiding officer of the Senate, the House of Representatives, and
the tribunal of accounts, governors, mayors, and councilmen;
(b) Judges and courts;
(c) The public prosecution service;
(d) Universities;
(e) Autonomous bodies authorized by the Constitution or the law;
(f) Every individual or collective person affected by an act or provision that he deems
unconstitutional. Persons not comprised in any of the foregoing paragraphs can also
apply to the court of constitutional and social guarantees, provided they furnish the
surety fixed by law....
Id.
39. Id. art. 194.
Cuban Constitutionalism
The Constitution of 1940 has been, and still is, a source of na-
tional pride to many Cubans for its progressive principles and its
truly Cuban origin.40
Although many of its far-reaching provisions were never im-
plemented, the document served as a codification of Cuban
aspirations for economic and social development and re-
mained a rallying point for the opposition throughout the dic-
tatorship of Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar. Its reenactment
was the stated goal of Castro's revolutionary movement and
remained the goal of Cuban exiles living in the United
States.. . ."
The Constitution of 1940 did not, however, produce a satisfactory
political system. As one commentator observed, "Graft and cor-
ruption were pervasive. Political competition became armed con-
frontation as partisan disputes were settled by assassinations and
thuggery."42  While Cuba did conduct three elections under the
Constitution, Fulgencio Batista reestablished military rule when
he seized power in a coup before the scheduled 1952 election.
The government established under Batista after the coup sus-
pended the Constitution of 1940 and imposed its own constitu-
tion.44
IV. CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1959
During the 1950s, opposition, including armed insurrection, in-
tensified against the abuses and incompetence of the Batista re-
gime. By 1958, even the United States began to withdraw its sup-
port for Batista and imposed an arms embargo.4 5 On January 1,
1959, the Batista regime collapsed and the July 2 6th Movement led
by Fidel Castro entered Havana with widespread support. As
Luis Perez observed
40. Klein, supra note 19, at 455.
41. RUDOLPH, supra note 25, at 161.
42. Louis A. PEREZ, CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES: TIES OF SINGULAR INTIMACY 233
(1990).
43. MAX AZICRI, CUBA: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY 22-25 (1988).
44. Klein, supra note 19, at 456-57. For criticism of Batista's efforts to impose his own
constitution, see INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, CUBA AND THE RULE OF LAW 82-
84 (1962).
45. PtREZ, supra note 42, at 235-37.
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An unpopular government was displaced, its political allies
discredited, and its armed forces defeated. Cubans had chal-
lenged a repressive regime on its own terms and succeeded-
unconditionally and unassisted... . The revolution had suc-
ceeded unconditionally and because it had, it could proceed to
make revolutionary change uncompromisingly.
As a result, although Castro's revolutionary movement had long
asserted that its goal was to restore the Constitution of 1940, it
did so in only the most formal sense. As I have observed else-
where:
When Castro triumphed in 1959, however, he soon proclaimed
what in effect was a new constitution, the Fundamental Law
of 1959. Although the new government maintained that the
Fundamental Law was merely an update of the 1940 Consti-
tution, it clearly was not. While many of the social and eco-
nomic rights formulations were retained, the Fundamental
Law made major alterations in the structure of the executive
and legislative powers. The position of the President from the
1940 document was retained but as a ceremonial figure-
head. Both legislative and executive functions were concen-
trated in the Council of Ministers which served at the pleas-
ure of the President. In reality, however, the President was
subservient to the wishes of the Prime Minister, the position
held under the Fundamental Law by Fidel Castro.
Although laws issued by the Council of Ministers formally
remained subject to judicial review under the Fundamental
Law, the power concentrated in the Council of Ministers ne-
gated the power of judicial review completely.4 7
A professor of law at the University of Havana has attempted to
rationalize the discrepancy between the promise to restore the
Constitution of 1940 and the actual rule under the Revolutionary
Government by noting that Fidel Castro had stated that a legiti-
mate constitution is one born directly from the people. The pro-
fessor explained that, therefore, the first revolutionary law was
one restoring the 1940 Constitution; but that, in order to imple-
46. Id. at 238-39.
47. Wise, supra note 34, at 256 (citations omitted); see INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF
JURISTS, supra note 44, at 91-113 (1962); see also D'Zurilla, supra note 21, at 1239-41.
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ment it and to punish those who had betrayed it, the revolutionary
movement-as temporary incarnation of people's sovereignty, the
only legitimate source of power-assumed all the powers: to legis-
late, to execute, and to judge.48 In reality, although the Funda-
mental Law was soon adopted, the incarnation of the people's sov-
ereignty in the revolutionary movement was far from temporary.
Rule continued under the Fundamental Law for seventeen years
until the adoption of a doctrinaire Marxist-Leninist constitution in
1976, a time when Cuba was highly dependent on support from
the Soviet Union.
V. THE CONSTITUTION OF 197649
Although the Revolution of 1959 started out with rather broad
support for ousting the Batista regime, it quickly changed to adopt
a more radical socialist and then Marxist-Leninist character."o
Because the Fundamental Law focused all real power in the
Council of Ministers and was easy to amend, the change in the
nature of the Cuban government could be accomplished rapidly."
The early confiscations of property, the hostility of the United
States, the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the
U.S. trade embargo, and the other heightened tensions of the Cold
War all served to increase Cuba's commitment to Marxist-Leninist
ideology.5 2 With regard to its constitution, however, revolutionary
Cuba was not so quick to follow the new ideology. Marxist-
Leninist ideology usually suggested that the Marxist-Leninist
"structure must be embodied at an early moment in a document of
'constitutional' nature."" Cuba did not begin the process of adopt-
ing a constitution consistent with that ideology until 1974.
In 1974, both the Council of Ministers and the Political Bureau
of the PCC appointed a subgroup from their members to draft a
new constitution consistent with Marxist-Leninist principles.5 4
The Council and the Bureau then considered the draft and, after
48. JUAN VEGA VEGA, CUBA: Su HISTORIA CONSTITUCIONAL 97-98 (1997).
49. CONST. (1976) (Cuba) (as amended by Law on Constitutional Reform, June 28,
1978) is available in English translation in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD
93, 100-34 (William B. Simons ed. 1980).
50. AZICRI, supra note 43, at 27.
51. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, supra note 44, at 91-113.
52. PEREZ, supra note 42, at 239-45, 248-52, 257-60.
53. John N. Hazard, The Common Core of Marxian Socialist Constitutions, 19 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 297, 297 (1982).
54. The Constitution is modeled after the Soviet Constitution of 1936. RUDOLPH, supra
note 25, at 162.
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slight changes, submitted it for broad consideration by popular
organizations. The First Party Congress, also making slight
changes, approved the final draft and submitted it to a public ref-
erendum where it was reported to have received 97.7% approval. 5
It entered into effect on February 24, 1976."
The Constitution of 1976 follows Marxist-Leninist ideology
closely by adopting the principle of the unity of power. This prin-
ciple has been explained by Professor Brewer-Carias:
One of the basic principles of the constitutional systems of the
socialist countries, principally derived from the influence of
Soviet constitutionalism, is the principle of the unity of state
powers based on the assignment of all legislative and execu-
tive powers of state to its representative democratic body.
This representative political organ is the supreme organ of
state power and the only one able to create law and control
the activities of all other state organs.
The Constitution of 1976 followed this principle by having Assem-
blies of People's Power elected by the people of their region, these
assemblies then elected the member of the Provincial Assemblies,
whose members, in turn, elected the National Assembly of Peo-
ple's Power. The National Assembly then elected the Council of
State and the President." Amendments to the Constitution in
1992, however, provided for the direct election of the National As-
sembly. 9 The primary difference between the Constitution of
1976 and the usual socialist model is in its creation of a strong
presidency by permitting the same person to be President of the
Council of State and President of the Council of Ministers." Of
course, a strong President is very much in keeping with Latin
American tradition.6
The doctrine of the unity of power stands in sharp contrast to
the principle of separation of powers. While it shares a political
theory similar to the ideas of parliamentary sovereignty, it has a
harsher ideological tone-separation of powers is regarded as a
55. Klein, supra note 19, at 461-65 (quoting Speech by Fidel Castro (Feb. 17, 1976),
REV. Cu. DER., Jan-June 1976, at 101-02).
56. Id. at 465.
57. ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW 236 (1989).
58. Klein, supra note 19, at 499-513.
59. See discussion infra note 75.
60. CONST. (1976), art. 69, (Cuba).
61. JORGE I. DOMINGUEZ, CUBA: ORDER AND REVOLUTION 243-44 (1978).
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bourgeois idea to prevent the working class from asserting its le-
gitimate power.6 As a result, the unity of power doctrine rejects
the possibility of an independent judiciary exercising the control of
constitutionality. The logic of the theory is summarized by Profes-
sor Mauro Cappelletti:
All powers are united in one supreme organ drawn directly
from the people, who are "the source of all power." Thus the
laws which emanate from the supreme organ. . . . whose
members are popularly elected, represent "the will of the
whole sovereign people." Accordingly, from the principles of
the unity of powers and the supremacy of the people flows the
corollary that, under socialist systems, constitutional control
may not be exercised by extra-parliamentary bodies . . . ."
In keeping with this doctrine, the Constitution of 1976 gives the
responsibility for the control of constitutionality to the political
legislative bodies it establishes,64 with ultimate power to deter-
mine compliance with the Constitution residing in the National
Assembly." However, since the National Assembly only meets
briefly during the year, the Constitution grants the Council of
62. VEGA, supra note 48, at 331-41.
63. MAURO CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 7 (1971)
(footnotes omitted).
64. The Constitution provides that with regard to the lower levels of government that
"within the limits of their jurisdiction, the Assemblies of People's Power: annul, suspend, or
modify, provincial and municipal as the case may be, the resolutions and measures of the
organs subordinate to them which violate the Constitution . . . ." CONST. (1976), art. 105(c),
(Cuba).
65. Article 73 provided, in part:
Article 73. The National Assembly of People's Power is vested with the following
powers:
c) deciding on the constitutionality of laws, decree-laws, decrees, and all other gen-
eral provisions;
u) revoking those provisions or decree-laws of the Council of State, and the decrees or
resolutions of the Council of Ministers which are contrary to the Constitution or the
laws;
v) annulling or modifying those resolutions or provisions of the local organs of Peo-
ple's Power which violate the Constitution....
CONST. (1976), art. 73, (Cuba). These provisions are now contained in CONST. (1976), art.
75(c), (r), & (s), (Cuba), as amended July 10-12, 1992.
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State the power to suspend the provisions of the Council of Minis-
ters and of Lower Assemblies that it determines to be unconstitu-
tional and to report its actions to the next National Assembly.66
Finally, in keeping with Marxist-Leninist practice, the Consti-
tution of 1976 used highly partisan language of class struggle and
explicitly recognized Cuba's special relationship to the Soviet Un-
ion and its bloc of allies." Of particular significance, Article 5 es-
tablished the preeminent role of the PCC:
The Communist Party of Cuba, the organized Marxist Lenin-
ist vanguard of the working class, is the highest leading force
of society and of the state, which organizes and guides the
common effort toward the goals of the construction of social-
ism and progress toward a communist society."
The Constitution of 1976 also articulated basic rights in highly
partisan terms. Two examples are illustrative. First, Article 52
defined the right to speak freely in this manner:
Citizens have freedom of speech and of the press in keeping
with the goals of the socialist society. Material conditions for
the exercise of that right are provided by the fact that the
press, radio, television, movies, and other organs of the mass
media are state or social property and can never be private
property. This assures their use at the exclusive service of
the working people and in the interests of society. The law
regulates the exercise of these freedoms."
Second, Article 54 concerning religion stated:
The socialist state, which bases its activity on and educates
the people in the scientific materialist concept of the universe,
recognizes and ensures freedom of conscience and the right of
everyone to profess any religious belief and to practice, within
the framework of respect for the law, the belief of his prefer-
66. CONST. (1976), art. 88(q), (Cuba); CONST. (1976), 90(fu), (Cuba), as amended July 10-
12, 1992.
67. For example, the Preamble of the Constitution contains the phrase:
By the victorious doctrine of Marxism-Leninism; . .. Basing ourselves ... On prole-
tarian internationalism, on the fraternal friendship, help, and cooperation of the So-
viet Union and other socialist countries, and on the solidarity of the workers and the
peoples of Latin America and of the world ....
CONST. (1976), preamble, (Cuba).
6& Id. art. 5.
69. Id. art. 52.
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ence. The law regulates the activities of religious institutions.
It is illegal and punishable by law to oppose one's faith or re-
ligious belief to the Revolution, education or the filfillment of
the duty to work, to the defense of the homeland with arms, to
the show of reverence for its symbols, and to other duties es-
tablished by the Constitution.70
While some of this language has now been muted by the
amendments to the Constitution adopted in 1992 following the
demise of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,
the basics of the Constitution of 1976 remain in force. The protec-
tion of rights afforded in the Constitution and the practices of the
Cuban Government continue to fall far short of international hu-
man rights norms."
VI. THE 1992 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
The fall of the Soviet Union and the retreat from communism in
Eastern and Central Europe was a great shock to the Cuban sys-
tem. The Cuban Government moved to make enough changes to
survive while avoiding the fate of the communist regimes in Eu-
72
rope. The changes were regarded as "limited economic reforms
dictated by the critical state of the Cuban economy. . . . The tran-
sition's purpose is to buy time for the current government to ena-
ble it to remain in power with minimum departures from social-
ism."7 In July of 1992, the National Assembly made several
amendments to the Constitution in response to the crisis. The
amendments primarily made changes to the economic provisions
by opening some possibility for limited private ownership of the
70. Id. art. 54.
71. See Joanne Mariner, Cuba: Improvements Without Reform, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
AMERICAS (Oct., 1995), at 1, 3.
72. Jorge Dominguez observed in 1993:
Cuban leaders have learned several lessons from the attempted reforms that eventu-
ally undermined other communist regimes. Lesson no. 1: undertake as few political
reforms as possible. Lesson no. 2: get rid of deadwood in the party early, before you
are forced to do so. Lesson no. 3: deal harshly with potential or evident disloyalty.
Lesson no. 4: do not allow a formal opposition to organize.
Jorge I. Dominguez, The Secrets of Castro's Staying Power, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Spring 1993,
at 97, 99.
73. Matias F. Travieso-Diaz and Steven R. Escobar, Cuba's Transition to a Free-Market
Democracy: A Survey of Required Changes to Laws and Legal Institutions, 5 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 379, 385-86 (1995) (citations omitted).
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means of production and of property and by also eliminating the
state monopoly on foreign trade."
The 1992 amendments also included other changes directed at
more the political aspects of the Constitution. One such change
was to allow for the direct election by secret ballot of deputies to
the National, Provincial and Municipal Assemblies." This change
did not greatly increase open political participation, however.
The Electoral Law passed in November of 1992 provided that can-
didates will be proposed by commissions and selected by municipal
assemblies with only the same number of candidates allowed to
appear on the election ballot as there are positions available."
The Amendments of 1992 removed those statements in the 1976
Constitution that explicitly recognized Cuba's relationship with
the Soviet block of nations." The Amendments also eliminated
some of the harshest Marxist-Leninist ideological rhetoric of the
1976 Constitution. For example, prior to the amendments, Article
66 read: "State organs are set up, operate, and carry out their ac-
tivities based on the principles of socialist democracy, unity of
power, and democratic centralism .... "78 The 1992 amendments,
changed the language to read: "The State organs are formed and
engage in their activity based on the principles of socialist democ-
racy. . . ."' Additionally, Article 123 of the Constitution of 1976,
which had laid out an extremely partisan role for the courts, was
removed entirely."o The Amendments of 1992, however, do not
74. Shari-Ellen Bourque, Note: The Illegality of the Cuban Embargo in the Current
International System, 13 B. U. INT'L L. J. 191, 203-05 (1995).
75. CONST. (1976), art. 71, (Cuba ), as amended July 10-12, 1992. Juan Escalona
Reguera, En Torn a la Ley de Reforma Constitucional, REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO, Oct.-
Dec. 1992, at 3, (This article contains the remarks to the National Assembly of Dr.
Escalona Reguera upon introducing the proposed reforms. He was the President of the
National Assembly of People's Power in 1992.)
76. Carollee Bengelsdorf, Cuba: Unchanging Change-The Boundaries of Democracy,
in DEMOCRACY IN THE CARIBBEAN: MYTHS AND REALITIES 181, 194-96 (Carlene J. Edie ed.,
1994).
77. Escalona Reguera, supra note 75, at 6.
78. CONST. (1976), art. 66, (Cuba).
79. Id. art. 68, as amended 10-12 July 1992.
80. CONST. (1976), art. 123, (Cuba) stated:
Article 123. The main objectives of the activities of the court are:
a) to maintain and strengthen socialist legality;
b) to safeguard the economic, social and political regime established in this Constitu-
tion;




alter the 1976 Constitution's placement of the power of constitu-
tional control in the hands of the political branches: the National
Assembly and the Council of State."
Changes regarding religious freedom are perhaps most interest-
ing. In 1991, the Communist Party of Cuba ended its requirement
that one must be atheist to be a member.82 Additionally, the Con-
stitution as amended in 1992 substantially improved the protec-
tion for freedom of religion. All references to the "scientific mate-
rialist concept of the universe" and punishment for opposing one's
religious belief to the Revolution were removed. Now the guaran-
tee regarding religious freedom is contained in Article 55. It simp-
ly states:
The State, which recognizes, respects and guarantees freedom
of conscience and religion, simultaneously recognizes, re-
spects, and guarantees the freedom of every citizen to change
religious creeds, or not to have any: and to profess the reli-
gious worship of their choice, with respect for the law.
The law regulates the State's relations with religious institu-
tions."
These changes regarding some greater space for religion are quite
possibly not motivated by a higher regard for freedom by the Cu-
ban Government. Rather, it has been suggested that:
d) to safeguard the rights and legitimate interests of state agencies and those of eco-
nomic and social institutions and the masses;
e) to protect the life, freedom, dignity, honor, property, family relations, and other le-
gitimate rights and interests of citizens;
f) to prevent violations of the law and anti-social conduct, restrain and reeducate
those who are guilty of such violations or conduct, and reestablish the rule of legal
standards when demands are made in protest against their violation;
g) to increase awareness as to the need for strictly observing the law, making timely
comments in their decisions aimed at educating citizens in the conscious and volun-
tary fulfillment of their duty of loyalty to the Fatherland, the cause of socialism, and
the norms of socialist living.
CONST. (1976), art. 123, (Cuba).
81. CONST. (1976), arts. 75(c), (r) & (s), 90 (fi), (Cuba), as amended July 10-12, 1992.
82. Jill I. Goldenziel, Sanctioning Faith: Religion, State, and U.S.-Cuban Relations, 25
J. L. & POL. 179, 180 (2009).
83. CONST. (1976), art. 55, (Cuba), as amended July 10-12, 1992.
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[C]uba changed its constitution to exploit U.S. regulations
that allow economic aid to flow into the island via religious
groups. While seemingly increasing constitutional freedoms,
the Cuban Government has actually used religion to increase
its own political strength. By softening its anti-religious
stance, the Cuban government has opened its tightly con-
trolled spiritual and economic marketplaces in the wake of its
economic crisis caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. At
the same time, the Cuban state has bolstered its own power
by stifling political opposition by religious groups . . . . The
government acted carefully to ensure that its actions would
quell potential civil unrest rather than fomenting rebellion.
The government wished to avoid cooptation of its political
power by religious groups while bolstering its popular support
through religious deregulation.84
This view is perhaps confirmed by the failure of the amendments
to make any changes to the highly partisan and restrictive Article
purporting to guarantee freedom of expression." Nevertheless, it
is clear, as even Cuba's harshest critic the United States acknowl-
edges, "the government's respect for religious freedom improved."
VII. LAw OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM OF 2002
On May 20, 2002, President George W. Bush gave remarks at
the White House commemorating the 1 0 0th anniversary of Cuban
independence. The speech contained harsh rhetoric condemning
the lack of economic and political freedom in Cuba and demanding
changes, including changes to Cuba's electoral procedures. The
speech also suggested, however, that the United States would re-
ciprocate by incrementally easing the economic embargo against
Cuba, provided that Cuba undertook far-reaching political and
economic reforms on its part." The Cuban government dismissed
the speech, dwelling on its harsh language and interpreting the
84. Goldenziel, supra note 82, at 181, 193.
85. Compare supra text accompanying notes 82 - 83, with CONST. (1976), art. 53, (Cu-
ba), as amended July 10-12, 1992.
86. U.S. DEPT OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT FOR 2011: CUBA,
ExEcuTIvE SUMMARY, available at
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper.





Bush statement as demanding regime change in Cuba." In re-
sponse, meetings of mass organizations demanded amendment of
the constitution to guarantee the continuation of the socialist
state. The National Assembly of People's Power obliged by pass-
ing Law of Constitutional Reform, 2002, on June 26, 2002.89 The
amendments were "intended to restate and reinforce the socialist
and social-evolutionary principles of the Cuban State as well as to
constitutionalize Cuba's sovereignty and foreign policy to be free of
foreign influence and aggression."90 Fortunately, under the presi-
dencies of Rail Castro and Barrack Obama the rhetoric of both
countries has moderated and small changes in economic policy
have resumed."
VIII. CONCLUSION
President Raul Castro has suggested in his comments and ac-
tions a willingness to tolerate some open discussion of policy al-
ternatives, to be less concerned with rhetoric, and more concerned
with adopting policies that will address Cuba's difficult economic
circumstances. The Constitutional Amendments of 1992 show
that incremental improvements in the Cuban constitutional struc-
ture can accompany and, indeed, may be necessary to accomplish
desired economic goals. One can hope that the current small
changes in Cuban policy and greater openness to debate may lead
to similar discussion and movement toward a more democratic
constitutional structure.
88. Jorge I Dominguez, Reshaping the Relations Between the United States and Cuba,
in DEBATING U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS: SHALL WE PLAY BALL? 32, 40-41 (2012).
89. The Republic of Cuba: Introductory and Comparative Notes, THE CONSTITUTIONS OF




91. See Dominguez, supra note 88, at 42-45; see also supra text accompanying notes 11-
18.
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